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INTRODUCTION 
The ground-breaking report on forensic science by the National Acade-
my of Sciences—Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A 
Path Forward1—raised numerous issues.2  One dominant theme that runs 
throughout the Report is the failure of some forensic science disciplines to 
comport with fundamental scientific principles—in particular, to support 
claims with empirical research.  The Report observed that “some forensic 
science disciplines are supported by little rigorous systematic research to 
validate the discipline’s basic premises and techniques.  There is no evident 
reason why such research cannot be conducted.”3  The Report went on to 
 
∗ Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. 
 1. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCI., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE 
IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009), available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
nij/grants/228091.pdf [hereinafter NAS FORENSIC SCIENCE REPORT]. 
 2. Id. The Report makes numerous recommendations.  Some are structural—i.e., the 
creation of an independent federal entity (the National Institute of Forensic Sciences) to 
oversee the field and the removal of crime laboratories from the administrative control of 
law enforcement agencies.  Other recommendations include the accreditation of crime la-
boratories, the certification of examiners, research on human observer bias, standardization 
of terminology, and more comprehensive lab reports. 
 3. Id. at 22 (emphasis added).  At another point, the Report states: 
The simple reality is that the interpretation of forensic evidence is not always 
based on scientific studies to determine its validity.  This is a serious problem.  
Although research has been done in some disciplines, there is a notable dearth of 
peer-reviewed, published studies establishing the scientific bases and validity of 
many forensic methods. 
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identify fingerprint examinations,4 firearms (ballistics) and toolmark identi-
fications,5 document comparisons,6 hair analysis,7 and bite mark examina-
tions8 as disciplines lacking such empirical research. 
This essay attempts to answer the “why” question: Why was there a lack 
of research across so many forensic disciplines?  For purposes of discus-
sion, the time frame is divided into an early period and a recent period.  
The line of demarcation between the two eras is the advent of DNA profil-
ing in the late 1980s, along with the Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.9  If not a perfect line of de-
marcation, this division is a useful one for present purposes. 
I.  EARLY PERIOD 
An understanding of this formative period requires some appreciation of 
the time frame in which courts first admitted forensic identification evi-
dence, the dates that crime laboratories were established, and the legal sys-
tem’s weaknesses during this era. 
A. Initial Admissibility Decisions 
The Illinois Supreme Court decided the first reported fingerprint case in 
this country, People v. Jennings,10 in 1911.11  Handwriting evidence was 
 
Id. at 8; see also id. at 53 (“The bottom line is simple: In a number of forensic science dis-
ciplines, forensic science professionals have yet to establish either the validity of their ap-
proach or the accuracy of their conclusions, and the courts have been utterly ineffective in 
addressing this problem.”). 
 4. See id. at 144. 
 5. See id. at 154. 
 6. See id. at 166. 
 7. See id. at 161. 
 8. See id. at 174. 
 9. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  The Court followed with General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 
U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), to make up what 
is known as the Daubert trilogy.  Daubert is one of the most important evidence cases ever 
decided. 
 10. 96 N.E. 1077 (Ill. 1911). 
 11. As one court has noted: 
The first English appellate endorsement of fingerprint identification testimony 
was the 1906 opinion in Rex v. Castleton, . . .  In 1906 and 1908, Sergeant Joseph 
Faurot, a New York City detective who had in 1904 been posted to Scotland Yard 
to learn about fingerprinting, used his new training to break open two celebrated 
cases: in each instance fingerprint identification led the suspect to confess . . . . 
United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 572 (E.D. Pa. 2002).  For a thorough dis-
cussion of the history of fingerprints, see SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY 
OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION (2001). 
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used in the Alfred Dreyfus case12 at the turn of the twentieth century in Eu-
rope and was well established by the time of  the Lindbergh kidnapping 
prosecution in 1935.13  Firearms identifications gained notoriety at the Sac-
co and Vanzetti trial in 192114 and then gained further acceptance after its 
use in the investigation of the Saint Valentine’s day massacre in Chicago at 
the end of that decade.15  By this time hair evidence had also been admitted 
as evidence.16  The only exception to this early judicial acceptance of fo-
rensic identification evidence is bite mark comparison evidence, which was 
first admitted at trial in State v. Doyle,17 a 1954 case which involved a bite 
mark left on a piece of cheese discovered at the scene of a burglary. 
Validating research for these techniques was absent from the beginning.  
As Professor Mnookin has noted: “[F]ingerprints were accepted as an evi-
dentiary tool without a great deal of scrutiny or skepticism.”18  Similarly, in 
examining the origins of handwriting evidence, Professor Risinger and his 
colleagues observed: 
 
 12. See JEAN-DENIS BREDIN, THE AFFAIR: THE CASE OF ALFRED DREYFUS 67-68, 94-95 
(Jeffrey Mehlman trans. 1986). 
 13. State v. Hauptmann, 180 A. 809, 822-23 (N.J. 1935). See generally Jennifer L. 
Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The History of Handwriting Identification Evidence and the 
Judicial Construction of Reliability, 87 VA. L. REV. 1723 (2001). 
 14. See G. LOUIS JOUGHIN & EDMUND M. MORGAN, THE LEGACY OF SACCO & VANZETTI 
11 (1948); James E. Starrs, Once More Unto the Breech: The Firearms Evidence in the Sac-
co and Vanzetti Case Revisited, 31 J. FORENSIC SCI. 630, 1050 (1986). 
 15. See Calvin Goddard, The Valentine Day Massacre: A Study in Ammunition-Tracing, 
1 AM. J. POLICE SCI. 60, 76 (1930) (“Since two of the members of the execution squad had 
worn police uniforms, and since it had been subsequently intimated by various persons that 
the wearers of the uniforms might really have been policeman rather than disguised gang-
sters, it became a matter of no little importance to ascertain, if possible, whether these ru-
mors had any foundation in fact.”); Jim Ritter, St. Valentine’s Hit Spurred Creation of Na-
tion’s First Lab, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 9, 1997, at 40 (“Sixty-eight years ago this Friday, Al 
Capone’s hit men dressed as cops and gunned down seven men in the Clark Street head-
quarters of rival mobster Bugs Moran.”). 
 16. The first reported use of forensic hair analysis occurred over 100 years ago, in 1861 
in Germany. See E. James Crocker, Trace Evidence, in FORENSIC EVIDENCE IN CANADA 259, 
265 (1991) (the analyst was a Berliner, Rudolf Virchow).  The first published American 
opinion discussing forensic hair analysis is Knoll v. State, 12 N.W. 369, 369-70 (Wis. 1882). 
 17. 263 S.W.2d 779, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 1954); see also PAUL C. GIANNELLI & ED-
WARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ch. 13 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing legal and 
scientific issues concerning bite mark comparisons). 
 18. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. 
L. REV. 13, 17 (2001).  “Even if no two people had identical sets of fingerprints, this did not 
establish that no two people could have a single identical print, much less an identical part 
of a print.  These are necessarily matters of probability, but neither the court in Jennings nor 
subsequent judges ever required that fingerprint identification be placed on a secure statis-
tical foundation.” Id. at 19 (emphasis added). 
GIANNELLI_CHRISTENSEN 1/31/2011  2:18 PM 
506 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVIII 
Our literature search for empirical evaluation of handwriting identifica-
tion turned up one primitive and flawed validity study from nearly 50 
years ago, one 1973 paper that raises the issue of consistency among ex-
aminers but presents only uncontrolled impressionistic and anecdotal in-
formation not qualifying as data in any rigorous sense, and a summary of 
one study in a 1978 government report.  Beyond this, nothing.19 
Moreover, after his imprisonment, Alfred Dreyfus was exonerated,20 and 
the firearm identification evidence in the Sacco and Vanzetti trial was mi-
sused.21 
B. Establishment of the Crime Laboratory 
The establishment of the modern crime laboratory did not result in the 
creation of a research base.  The first crime laboratory in this country was 
founded in Los Angeles in 1923.22  Other California labs followed,23 as did 
the Chicago crime lab in 1929.24  The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) laboratory came on line in 1932.  At its inception, the FBI laboratory 
staff included only firearm identification and fingerprint examiners.25  The 
laboratory later added handwriting comparisons, trace evidence examina-
 
 19. D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Know-
ledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification “Expertise,” 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 738 
(1989). 
 20. BREDIN, supra note 12, at 481 (“It had taken twelve years for France to vindicate an 
innocent man.”). 
 21. Many believe their execution resulted more from their foreign status and “radical” 
beliefs as anarchists than from the cogency of the evidence presented against them.  The 
presentation of the firearm identification evidence in that case remains problematic.  Profes-
sors Joughin and Morgan concluded that the evidence was “carelessly assembled, incom-
pletely and confusedly presented, and perhaps—most important of all—beyond the compre-
hension or judgment of the ordinary intelligent layman.” JOUGHIN & MORGAN, supra note 
14, at 15.  They also wrote: 
On October 23 Captain Proctor made an affidavit indicating that he had repeatedly 
told [the prosecutor] that he would have to answer in the negative if he were asked 
whether he had found positive evidence that the fatal bullet had been fired from 
Sacco’s pistol.  The statement which Proctor made on the witness stand was: “My 
opinion is that it is consistent with being fired by that pistol.” 
Id. 
 22. See John I. Thornton, Criminalistics: Past, Present and Future, 11 LEX ET SCIENTIA 
1, 23 (1975) (“In 1923, Vollmer served as Chief of Police of the City of Los Angeles for a 
period of one year.  During that time, a crime laboratory was established at his direction.”). 
 23. Id. at 23-24. 
 24. See JOE NICKELL & JOHN F. FISCHER, CRIME SCIENCE: METHODS OF FORENSIC DE-
TECTION 13 (1999) (“Perhaps the first truly significant crime laboratory that could be called 
a national lab was the Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory, which began at Chicago in 
1929 . . . .”). 
 25. See FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FBI LABORATORY 3 (1981). 
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tions, and the serological testing of blood and semen.26  When initially es-
tablished, crime laboratories handled a modest number of cases.  For in-
stance, in its first full year of operation, the FBI laboratory processed fewer 
than one thousand cases.27  Crime laboratories soon sprang up in other 
large cities during the “gangster era.”28 
Although reliance on physical evidence to solve crimes was a notewor-
thy reform,29 the establishment of these laboratories was ad hoc at best.  
One commentator observed: “Most laboratories owe their existence, not to 
progressive attitude on the part of police administrators, but because the 
police agencies inaugurating laboratory services were shamed into it by ad-
verse publicity or the threat of it” and “all too often the laboratory was 
poorly conceived, poorly equipped, and poorly staffed.”30  Another author, 
writing in the 1960s, reflected: 
After the early 1930s, crime laboratories were established in rapid fashion 
until nearly all states and the major cities had some facility for examining 
evidence.  Not all laboratories were properly founded.  No model existed 
and the development depended upon local whim and resources.  For rea-
sons of local pride, some departments created laboratories by the device 
of a name on the door.  In many places, what may be called a crime labor-
atory is in fact a small step beyond a latent fingerprint and photographic 
set-up, adequate for evidence collection but unsuited by equipment and 
staff to engage in the analysis and evaluation of evidence.31 
 
 26. See ANNIVERSARY REPORT, 40 YEARS OF DISTINGUISHED SCIENTIFIC ASSISTANCE TO 
LAW ENFORCEMENT, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 4 (1972). 
 27. Id. (“During its first month of service, the FBI Laboratory examiners handled twenty 
cases.  In its first full year of operation, the volume increased to a total of 963 examinations.  
By the next year that figure more than doubled.”). 
 28. “[T]he Chicago Crime Laboratory has the distinction of being one of the oldest in 
the country.  Soon after, however, many other jurisdictions also built police laboratories in 
an attempt to cope with the crimes of violence associated with the 1930s gangster era.”  Jo-
seph L. Peterson, The Crime Lab, in THINKING ABOUT POLICE 184, 185 (Carl B. Klockars 
ed., 1983). 
 29. As is true today, prosecutors frequently relied on eyewitness testimony and confes-
sions.  The reliability of physical evidence is often superior to that of other types of proof.  
For example, in 1927, Justice Frankfurter, then a law professor, sharply critiqued the eye-
witness identifications in the Sacco and Vanzetti case. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CASE 
OF SACCO AND VANZETTI: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS AND LAYMEN 30 (1927) 
(“What is the worth of identification testimony even when uncontradicted?  The identifica-
tion of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy.”).  In 1936, the Supreme Court expressed 
grave reservations about the trustworthiness of confessions wrung from a suspect by abusive 
interrogation techniques. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281, 287 (1936) (finding 
a due process violation in the beating of a confession out of a suspect). 
 30. Thornton, supra note 22, at 27. 
 31. Joseph D. Nicol, Present Status of Criminalistics, in LAW ENFORCEMENT, SCIENCE 
AND TECHNOLOGY 245 (S.A. Yefsky ed., 1967); see also Charles M. Wilson, Crime Detec-
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By this time, courts had accepted most of the forensic identification 
techniques mentioned earlier.32  Several reasons may explain the lack of re-
search in the ensuing decades.  First, the early crime labs, as is still true to-
day, were operational, not research, laboratories.33  Second, basic research 
can be both time-consuming and expensive, and the underfunding of crime 
laboratories has been chronic.34  Third, even if research was perceived to be 
desirable, these laboratories were ill-equipped to conduct it.  Police offic-
ers, whose skills were developed through on-the-job training, staffed these 
labs.35  As would be expected, they were imbued with a police, not scientif-
ic, culture.36 
Paul Kirk, a giant in the field of forensic science, described the research 
in 1963 as follows: 
[Forensic science] progress has been technical rather than fundamental, 
practical rather than theoretical, transient rather than permanent.  Many 
persons can identify the particular weapon that fired a bullet, but few if 
any can state a single fundamental principle of identification of firearms.  
Document examiners constantly identify handwriting, but a class of be-
ginners studying under these same persons, would find it difficult indeed 
 
tion Laboratories in the United States, in LAW, MEDICINE, SCIENCE, AND JUSTICE 464, 464 
(Larry Baer ed., 1964) (“The historical picture of crime detection laboratories in the United 
States is rather discouraging when viewed factually.”), reprinted in FORENSIC SCIENCE: 
SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 96 (Joseph L. Peterson ed., 1975). 
 32. See supra text accompanying notes 10-21. 
 33. See NAS FORENSIC SCIENCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 44 (“The forensic science 
community has had little opportunity to pursue or become proficient in the research that is 
needed to support what it does.  Few sources of funding exist for independent forensic re-
search.  Most of the studies are commissioned by DOJ and conducted by crime laboratories 
with little or no participation by the traditional scientific community.”). 
 34. See U.S. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, GENETIC WITNESS:  FORENSIC USES OF DNA 
TESTS 30 (1990) (“Most agree that crime laboratories and forensic sciences research that 
supports technology transfer to crime laboratories are underfunded.  Increasingly, indica-
tions are that crime laboratories are experiencing difficulties managing the steadily rising 
influx of casework.”); see also PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF 
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 255 (1967) (“[T]he great majority of 
police department laboratories have only minimal equipment and lack highly skilled per-
sonnel able to use the modern equipment now being developed . . . .”). 
 35. See NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, PO-
LICE 303 (1974) (“There are . . . many police laboratories that have been staffed almost ex-
clusively with sworn personnel.”). 
 36. See Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 642 
(1983) (statement of Professor Joseph Peterson) (“[T]he police agency controls the formal 
and informal system of rewards and sanctions for the laboratory examiners.”); see also MI-
CHAEL J. SAKS & RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION 
53 (1983) (“Given what is known about reference group phenomena, the need that people 
have for social support of attitudes and conduct, and the process of socialization in occupa-
tional settings, it strains credulity to believe that these experts do not identify with prosecu-
tors.”). 
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to distinguish the basic principles used.  In short, there exists in the field 
of criminalistics a serious deficiency in basic theory and principles, as 
contrasted with the large assortment of effective technical procedures.37 
One exception to the dearth of research might be the paraffin test for the 
detection of gunshot residue on a shooter’s hand, which was introduced in 
this country in the 1930s.  However, even this is not an encouraging exam-
ple.  That test was admitted at trial for over thirty years before it was de-
bunked by research.38  In hindsight, a university-based, rather than a law 
enforcement-based, system would have been preferable.39 
C. The Legal System 
The legal system shares responsibility for the lack of research.  Expe-
rience gleaned from the DNA admissibility wars indicates that adversarial 
procedures sometimes do trigger research.40  Even the DNA proponents 
subsequently conceded that “most would now agree that this extended de-
bate has been good for the science.”41  In contrast, there was little incentive 
for the government to sponsor research to validate the premises of forensic 
techniques that the courts had already accepted.42 
 
 37. Paul L. Kirk, The Ontogeny of Criminalistics, 54 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & PO-
LICE SCI. 235, 235 (1963). 
 38. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United 
States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1224-25, 1227 (1980) (discussing 
the history of the paraffin test). 
 39. See Scott Bales, Turning the Microscope Back on Forensic Scientists, 26 LITIGATION 
51, 55 (Winter 2000) (“The tie between crime labs and law enforcement agencies is not in-
evitable.  In part, it is a product of history: rudimentary crime labs were first established 
near the turn of the century by law enforcement agencies when officials began to recognize 
the possible application of science to criminal investigations.  Since that time, the relation-
ship between labs and law enforcement has flourished because of practical benefits—for 
example, streamlining tasks such as close and timely communication, the transfer of evi-
dence, and record-keeping.”). 
 40. See MIKE REDMAYNE, EXPERT EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 204 (2001) (“[The 
British] Forensic Science Service adopted a method of calculating DNA match probabilities 
that had been proposed by statisticians associated with the defence side of the DNA dis-
pute.”); Mnookin, supra note 18, at 70 (“[W]hile it is easy to disparage ‘battles of the ex-
perts’ as expensive, misleading, and confusing to the factfinder, these battles may also re-
veal genuine weaknesses in proffered expert knowledge.”). 
 41. IAN W. EVETT & BRUCE S. WEIR, INTERPRETING DNA EVIDENCE: STATISTICAL GE-
NETICS FOR FORENSIC SCIENTISTS, at xiv (1998); see also Richard Lempert, Comment, 
Theory and Practice in DNA Fingerprinting, 9 STAT. SCI. 255, 258 (1994) (“[I]n this in-
stance the importation of legal adversariness into the scientific world has spurred both valu-
able research and practical improvements in the way DNA is analyzed and presented.”). 
 42. Far more research was conducted on polygraph testing during this time, the results 
of which had long been excluded. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 17, § 
8.03[c]. 
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In Daubert, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the adver-
sary process by noting that “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of 
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the 
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evi-
dence.”43  However, the Supreme Court did not recognize the right to a de-
fense attorney in all felony trials until Gideon v. Wainwright44 in 1963.  
Furthermore, the right to a defense expert, albeit a limited one, was not 
firmly established until Ake v. Oklahoma45 in 1985.  The woeful inadequa-
cy of pretrial discovery in criminal prosecutions, especially when compared 
to civil cases, also undermined attempts to challenge forensic evidence.46  
For example, in 2009, the Supreme Court observed that the laboratory re-
port in one case  
contained only the bare-bones statement that “[t]he substance was found 
to contain: Cocaine.”  At the time of trial, petitioner did not know what 
tests the analysts performed, whether those tests were routine, and wheth-
er interpreting their results required the exercise of judgment or the use of 
skills that the analysts may not have possessed.47 
Moreover, the evidentiary standards in place were not geared to analyz-
ing the underlying basis of scientific proof.  In 1923, the D.C. Circuit 
created the “general acceptance” test for determining the admissibility of 
scientific evidence.  The case, Frye v. United States,48 involved a precursor 
of the modern polygraph.  Although the general acceptance test eventually 
became the majority pre-Daubert view,49 it was mostly limited to poly-
 
 43. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (citing Rock v. Ar-
kansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)). 
 44. 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963). 
 45. 470 U.S. 68, 86-87 (1985). See generally Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The 
Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 
1311-13 (2004) (discussing the legal disputes over the scope of Ake—i.e., whether it applied 
to non-capital cases and to non-psychiatric experts). 
 46. See generally Paul C. Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and DNA, 
44 VAND. L. REV. 791 (1991) (examining deficiencies in pretrial discovery in criminal cas-
es). 
 47. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2009) (holding that in the 
absence of an opportunity to cross-examine the analyst, admission of a laboratory certificate 
identifying a substance as cocaine violated the Confrontation Clause). 
 48. 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 49. See United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 163 n.3 (8th Cir. 1975) (“[F]ederal 
courts of appeals continue to subscribe to [the] ‘general scientific acceptability’ criterion.”); 
Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (Md. 1978) (“This criterion of ‘general acceptance’ in the 
scientific community has come to be the standard in almost all of the courts in the country 
which have considered the question of the admissibility of scientific evidence.”). 
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graph cases for several decades.50  Under the general acceptance test, scien-
tific testimony is admissible if the underlying theory or technique is gener-
ally accepted by the specialists within the expert’s field.  This test did not 
require foundational proof of the empirical validity of the technique’s 
scientific premises. 
In the late 1960s, the introduction of several new types of evidence awa-
kened a new interest in the admissibility of expert testimony and the Frye 
rule.51  The controversy surrounding the admission of sound spectrometry 
(“voiceprint”) evidence could have sparked a reappraisal of traditional fo-
rensic techniques, but it did not.  Courts admitted voiceprint evidence in 
numerous trials during the 1970s52—until a National Academy of Sciences 
report raised questions about its validity.53  That technique, however, had a 
far more extensive empirical basis than many forensic techniques.54  Yet, 
the NAS report concluded that further research was required to establish its 
reliability.55 
 
 50. Courts cited Frye only five times in published opinions before World War II, mostly 
in polygraph cases.  After World War II, Frye was cited six times before 1950, twenty times 
during the 1950s and twenty-one times in the 1960s. Bert Black et al., Science and the Law 
in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 722 
n.30 (1994) (citing Shepard’s Federal Citations). 
 51. In addition to voiceprints, neutron activation analysis was introduced at this time.  
See, e.g., United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970) (bomb debris); United 
States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1969) (narcotics); State v. Coolidge, 260 A.2d 547, 
561 (N.H. 1969) (particle analysis admitted; hair analysis excluded), rev’d on other grounds 
403 U.S. 443 (1971); see also GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 17, § 11.04 (noting 
the admissibility of expert testimony based on activation analysis regarding “gunshot resi-
dues, bullets, hair, glass, paint, and other substances”). 
 52. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 17, § 10.06 (discussing scientific and 
legal issues involving voiceprints). 
 53. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCI., ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
VOICE IDENTIFICATION (1979) [hereinafter NAS REPORT]. 
 54. Dr. Oscar Tosi reported an extensive study on voiceprints in 1972.  Conducted at 
Michigan State University over a two-year period, this study involved 34,992 experimental 
trials with 250 male speakers and 29 examiners.  False identification errors occurred in ap-
proximately 5-6% of the trials which most closely resembled the forensic situation.  The er-
ror rate was reduced to approximately 2% if the trials in which the examiners expressed 
“uncertainty” about their conclusions were eliminated. NAT’L INST. L. ENF. & CRIM. JUST., 
VOICE IDENTIFICATION RESEARCH (1972) (submitted to Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-
ministration by the Department of Michigan State Police). 
 55. The Report concluded: 
The practice of voice identification rests on the assumption that intraspeaker va-
riability is less than or different from interspeaker variability. However, at present 
the assumption is not adequately supported by scientific theory and data. View-
points about probable errors in identification decisions at present result mainly 
from various professional judgments and fragmentary experimental results rather 
than from objective data representative of results in forensic applications. 
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II.  RECENT PERIOD: POST-DNA, POST-DAUBERT 
As noted earlier, the second period commenced with the introduction of 
DNA evidence in the late 1980s, followed by the Daubert decision in 
1993.56  First introduced in 1986 in the United Kingdom, DNA evidence 
revolutionized forensic science.57  Private laboratories developed DNA 
evidence, and it rested upon strong university-based research.58  Conse-
quently, it soon became the “gold standard” in forensic science.59  Citing 
DNA profiling, Professors Saks and Koehler wrote in 1991 that  
forensic scientists, like scientists in all other fields, should subject their 
claims to methodologically rigorous empirical tests.  The results of these 
tests should be published and debated.  Until such steps are taken, the 
strong claims of forensic scientists must be regarded with far more cau-
tion than they traditionally have been.60 
In the same year, Professor Jonakait published a multi-pronged critique 
of forensic science, stating: “Forensic science is supported by almost no re-
search.  The laboratory practices are based on intuitions and deductions, not 
 
The Committee concludes that the technical uncertainties concerning the present 
practice of voice identification are so great as to require that forensic applications 
be approached with great caution. 
NAS REPORT, supra note 53, at 2. 
 56.  See supra text accompanying note 9. 
 57. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-BA-438, GENETIC WIT-
NESS:  FORENSIC USES OF DNA TESTS 8 (1990).  In 1985, Dr. Alec Jeffreys of the University 
of Leicester, England, recognized the utility of DNA profiling in criminal cases. Id. at 7.  Its 
first use in American courts came two years later.  The first reported appellate case using 
DNA evidence was reported in 1988. See Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1988) (holding DNA evidence admissible), reh’g denied, 542 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1989). 
 58. See JAY D. ARONSON, GENETIC WITNESS:  SCIENCE, LAW, AND CONTROVERSY IN THE 
MAKING OF DNA PROFILING 7 (2007). See generally DAVID H. KAYE, DOUBLE HELIX AND 
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (2010). 
 59. See Joseph L. Peterson & Anna S. Leggett, The Evolution of Forensic Science: 
Progress Amid the Pitfalls, 36 STETSON L. REV. 621, 654 (2007) (“[T]he scientific integrity 
and reliability of DNA testing have helped DNA replace fingerprinting and made DNA evi-
dence the new ‘gold standard’ of forensic evidence.”). 
 60. Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, What DNA “Fingerprinting” Can Teach the 
Law About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 361, 372 (1991).  Professor 
Zabell would later note that “DNA identification has not only transformed and revolutio-
nized forensic science, it has also created a new set of standards that have raised expecta-
tions for forensic science in general.” Sandy L. Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J.L. & 
POL’Y 143, 143 (2005).  Similarly, Professor Mnookin observed that “[o]ne consequence of 
DNA profiling and its admissibility into court is that it has opened the door to challenging 
fingerprinting.”  Mnookin, supra note 18, at 43. 
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on empirical proof.”61  This review came only two years after Risinger and 
his colleagues’ searing critique of handwriting evidence.62 
With this backdrop, the Supreme Court decided Daubert in 1993.  As 
one scholar commented, “Daubert initiated a scientific revolution in the 
law.”63  In Daubert, the Court adopted a new reliability test for expert tes-
timony: 
[I]n order to qualify as “scientific knowledge,” an inference or assertion 
must be derived by the scientific method.  Proposed testimony must be 
supported by appropriate validation—i.e., “good grounds,” based on what 
is known.  In short, the requirement that an expert’s testimony pertain to 
“scientific knowledge” establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.64 
In addition, the Court listed several factors that trial judges may consider in 
assessing reliability.65  The first and the most important among the Daubert 
factors is empirical testing.66 
The implications of Daubert for forensic science were soon apparent.  
Writing about Daubert a year after it was decided, Professor Berger ob-
served: “Considerable forensic evidence made its way into the courtroom 
without empirical validation of the underlying theory and/or its particular 
application.  Courts never required some of the most venerable branches of 
forensic science—such as fingerprinting, ballistics, and handwriting—to 
demonstrate their ability to make unique identifications.”67  Other commen-
tators foresaw the same future: “[I]f Daubert is taken seriously, then much 
of forensic science is in serious trouble.”68 
 
 61. Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 109, 137 (1991). 
 62. See Risinger et al., supra note 19, at 749-50. 
 63. David L. Faigman, Science and the Law: Is Science Different for Lawyers?, 297 
SCIENCE 339, 340 (2002). 
 64. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993). 
 65. The now famous Daubert factors are: (1) testing; (2) peer review and publication; 
(3) error rate; (4) maintenance of standards; and (5) general acceptance. Id. at 593-94. 
 66. Id. at 593.  The Court’s others factors are generally complementary.  For example, 
the second factor, peer review and publication, tends to verify the results of the testing cited 
in the first factor and suggests general acceptance of the technique within the broader scien-
tific community.  Similarly, another factor, error rate, is derived from testing. 
 67. Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 78 MINN. 
L. REV. 1345, 1354 (1994). 
 68. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Meaning of Daubert and What That Means for Forensic 
Science, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2103, 2117 (2004); see also Barry C. Scheck, DNA and Dau-
bert, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1959, 1959 (2004) (“Daubert calls upon courts to undertake a 
much more sophisticated and informed analysis of scientific evidence than Frye v. United 
States.”). 
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The first significant challenge under Daubert involved handwriting evi-
dence in United States v. Starzecpyzel,69 decided in 1995.  In that case, the 
district court concluded that “forensic document examination, despite the 
existence of a certification program, professional journals and other trap-
pings of science, cannot, after Daubert, be regarded as ‘scientific . . . know-
ledge.’”70  The court stated that, “while scientific principles may relate to 
aspects of handwriting analysis, they have little or nothing to do with the 
day-to-day tasks performed by [Forensic Document Examiners (FDE)] . . . .  
[T]his attenuated relationship does not transform the FDE into a scien-
tist.”71  In the same year, microscopic hair analysis came under attack.  In 
Williamson v. Reynolds,72 a habeas case, another district court wrote that it 
had been “unsuccessful in its attempts to locate any indication that expert 
hair comparison testimony meets any of the requirements” of Daubert.73  
The court went on to observe: “Although the hair expert may have fol-
lowed procedures accepted in the community of hair experts, the human 
hair comparison results in this case were, nonetheless, scientifically unreli-
able.”74  In 1996, one year later, an article critical of hair analysis was pub-
lished: “If the purveyors of this dubious science cannot do a better job of 
validating hair analysis than they have done so far, forensic hair compari-
son analysis should be excluded altogether from criminal trials.”75 
In 1999, the Supreme Court in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,76 ruled 
that Daubert’s reliability test applied to all expert testimony, thereby ab-
olishing the distinction between “scientific” and “technical” expertise.  
 
 69. 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). See generally GIANNELLI &  IMWINKELRIED, su-
pra note 17, ch. 21 (discussing the scientific and legal issues associated with questioned 
document examinations). 
 70. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. at 1038 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702). 
 71. Id. at 1041.  The court did not exclude handwriting comparison testimony.  Instead, 
the court admitted the individuation testimony as “technical” evidence.  Id. at 1029.  Kumho 
Tire later called this aspect of the Starzecpyzel opinion into question because Kumho indi-
cated that the reliability requirement applied to all types of expertise—“scientific,” “tech-
nical,” or “specialized.” Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-49 (1999). 
 72. 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1554 (E.D. Okla. 1995), rev’d on this issue sub nom. Williamson 
v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1523 (10th Cir. 1997).  Although the Tenth Circuit did not fault the 
district judge’s reading of the empirical record relating to hair analysis and ultimately 
upheld habeas relief, the court reversed the district judge on this issue; the court ruled that 
the district court had committed error because the due process standard of fundamental fair-
ness, not the more stringent Daubert standard, controls evidentiary issues in habeas corpus 
proceedings. Williamson, 110 F.3d at 1522-23. 
 73. Williamson, 904 F. Supp. at 1558. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Clive A. Stafford Smith & Patrick A. Goodman, Forensic Hair Comparison Analy-
sis: Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil?, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 227, 231 (1996). 
 76. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
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Soon thereafter, Judge Gertner wrote that Daubert and Kumho invited 
“reexamination even of ‘generally accepted’ venerable, technical fields.”77  
She went on to limit the scope of handwriting testimony, permitting  testi-
mony concerning the general similarities and differences between a defen-
dant’s handwriting exemplar and a stick up note but not the specific con-
clusion that the defendant was the author.  Once again, commentators 
highlighted the potential impact of Kumho: “Yet all the areas of forensic 
science discussed in this article share two common denominators: In each 
area little rigorous, systematic research has been done to validate the dis-
cipline’s basic premises and techniques, and in each area there is no evident 
reason why such research would be infeasible.”78 
Early in 2002, Judge Pollak in United States v. Llera Plaza79 ruled that 
fingerprint experts would not be permitted to testify that two sets of prints 
“matched”—that is, establishing a positive identification to the exclusion of 
all other persons.  This was the first time in nearly 100 years that a court 
had rendered such a ruling.80  Although Judge Pollak reversed himself on 
rehearing, the case “sent shock waves through the community of fingerprint 
analysts.”81 
Any observer with a modicum of insight should have seen the writing on 
the wall.  And, some did.  In 2000, Stephen Bunch, an FBI firearms identi-
fication expert, wrote: 
[T]here is no rational or scientific ground for making claims of absolute 
certainty in any of the traditional identification sciences, which include 
fingerprint, document, firearms, toolmark, and shoe and tire-tread analy-
sis.  Case-specific conclusions of identity rest on a fundamental proposi-
tion, or hypothesis; namely, that no two fingerprints, bullets, etc., from 
different sources will appear sufficiently similar to induce a competent fo-
 
 77. See United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D. Mass. 1999) (handwriting 
comparison); see also United States v. Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d 961, 966 (D. Ariz. 2002) 
(“Courts are now confronting challenges to testimony, as here, whose admissibility had long 
been settled.”) (handwriting comparison). 
 78. Paul C. Giannelli & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence: The Fallout From 
Supreme Court’s Decision in Kumho Tires, 14 CRIM. JUST. 12, 40 (2000); see also Joan 
Griffin & David J. LaMagna, Daubert Challenges to Forensic Evidence: Ballistics Next on 
the Firing Line, 26 CHAMPION 20, 21 (2002). 
 79. 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002), vacated, motion granted on recons., 188 F. 
Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002). See generally GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 17, ch. 
18 (discussing the scientific and legal issues associated with fingerprint identification). 
 80.  Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 572 (“English and American trial courts have ac-
cepted fingerprint identification testimony for almost a century.”). 
 81. D.H. Kaye, The Nonscience of Fingerprinting: United States v. Llera-Plaza, 21 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1073, 1073 (2003). 
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rensic examiner to posit a common source.  But as any logician or philo-
sopher of science would insist, no hypothesis can be proved absolutely.82 
In 2003, when he was President of the American Academy of Forensic 
Sciences, Kenneth Melson, a former prosecutor and current Director of the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, wrote: 
[M]ore research is needed in the techniques and science already in use.  
With the importance of forensic science to truth and justice, the science 
employed and relied upon by judges and juries must be valid.  It does not 
matter how well forensic scientists abide by testing protocols or how reli-
able the techniques are, if the underlying science does not actually reveal 
what the expert says it does.  Method validation studies and new research 
must be ongoing even in the areas of traditional forensic science discip-
lines.  Justice demands good science and we have an obligation to provide 
it.  We can no longer expect the courts or public to accept the truth of our 
science merely because we say it is good.  In order to maintain the integri-
ty of both the science and the justice system, we must prove that it is so.83 
And yet, with the exception of handwriting,84 extensive empirical re-
search was not conducted.  Indeed, instead of leading efforts to ensure the 
development of a solid empirical basis, some forensic disciplines continued 
to deny the existence of a problem.  For example, FBI fingerprint experts 
insisted in court testimony that the “error rate for the method is zero.”85  A 
 
 82. Stephen G. Bunch, Consecutive Matching Striation Criteria: A General Critique, 45 
J. FORENSIC SCI. 955, 956 (2000). 
 83. Kenneth E. Melson, President’s Editorial: The Journey to Justice, 48 J. FORENSIC 
SCI. 705, 707 (2003).  For more recent commentary, see Thomas L. Bohan, President’s Edi-
torial: Strengthening Forensic Science: A Way Station on the Journey to Justice, 55 J. FO-
RENSIC SCI. 5, 6 (2010) (“[W]hat is needed immediately is a series of validation investiga-
tions.  A validation investigation is a threshold study to determine whether a technique or 
theory the scientific validation of which has been questioned has in fact already been scien-
tifically validated.”).  Barry Fisher, the former Director of the Crime Laboratory of the Los 
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, has said, “[w]e run the risk of our science being 
questioned in the courts because there is so little research.” KELLY M. PYREK, FORENSIC 
SCIENCE UNDER SIEGE: THE CHALLENGES OF FORENSIC LABORATORIES AND THE MEDICO-
LEGAL INVESTIGATION SYSTEM 231 (2007). 
 84. See, e.g., Moshe Kam et al., Effects of Monetary Incentives on Performance of Non-
Professionals in Document-Examination Proficiency Tests, 43 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1000 (1998); 
Moshe Kam et al., Writer Identification by Professional Document Examiners, 42 J. FOREN-
SIC SCI. 778 (1997) (false positive rate for professionals was 6.5% compared to 38.3% for 
non-professionals; forensic document examiners demonstrated a false positive error rate of 
only .5%); Sargur Srihari et al., Individuality of Handwriting, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 856 
(2002) (noting that 1500 individual handwriting samples scanned into a computer pro-
grammed to compare the samples based on a variety of features such as slant, height, num-
ber of interior contours, and  number of vertical slope components; computer matched ex-
emplars with a 98% accuracy rate). 
 85. United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854 (S.D. Ind. 2000), aff’d, 260 F.3d 
597 (7th Cir. 2001). But see NAS FORENSIC SCIENCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 142 (“Al-
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decade of time in which research could have been conducted—from Kum-
ho in 1999 to the NAS Report in 2009—was lost.  The NAS Report com-
mented on this issue, writing that “[t]he insistence by some forensic practi-
tioners that their disciplines employ methodologies that have perfect 
accuracy and produce no errors has hampered efforts to evaluate the use-
fulness of the forensic science disciplines.”86  In another passage, the Re-
port states: 
Parts of the forensic science community have resisted the implications of 
the mounting criticism of the reliability of forensic analyses by investiga-
tive units such as Inspector General reports, The Innocence Project, and 
studies in the published literature.  In testimony before the committee, it 
was clear that some members of the forensic science community will not 
concede that there could be less than perfect accuracy either in given la-
boratories or in specific disciplines . . . .  Failure to acknowledge uncer-
tainty in findings is common: Many examiners claim in testimony that 
others in their field would come to the exact same conclusions about the 
evidence they have analyzed.  Assertions of a “100 percent match” con-
tradict the findings of proficiency tests that find substantial rates of erro-
neous results in some disciplines (i.e., voice identification, bite mark 
analysis).87 
CONCLUSION 
Several factors may explain the lack of empirical research in the early 
part of the last century—most significantly, crime laboratories staffed by 
police officers with inadequate budgets and a lack of scientific training.  
Moreover, a good part of the failures can be attributed to inadequacies in 
the legal system—the lack of counsel, the failure to provide defense ex-
perts, and insufficient discovery. 
In recent years, however, the reason for the lack of empirical research 
was simply a stubborn refusal to reconsider beliefs in light of credible chal-
lenges.  This is the antithesis of the scientific method.  As the NAS Report 
noted, “openness to new ideas, including criticism and refutation” is a fun-
damental principle of the scientific method.88  Instead of taking the lead in 
ensuring that the needed research was conducted, many forensic practition-
ers adopted a “circle the wagons” mentality and attacked the critics.  As a 
result, the opportunity for empirical research during the last decade was 
 
though there is limited information about the accuracy and reliability of friction ridge ana-
lyses, claims that these analyses have zero error rates are not scientifically plausible.”). 
 86. NAS FORENSIC SCIENCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 47. 
 87. Id. at 46-47. 
 88. Id. at 113. 
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needlessly squandered.  A British scholar summed it up this way: “[I]f the 
state does not test the scientific evidence with which it seeks to convict de-
fendants, it should forfeit the right to use it.”89 
 
 89. REDMAYNE, supra note 40, at 139. 
